Maintenance of medical confidentiality is a fundamental duty of a physician. It is derived from the right to privacy, which, as a constitutionally protected value, can only be restricted under exceptional circumstances. Medical law provisions should therefore precisely define exceptions to discretion. One of these exceptions is the ability to disclose confidential information after the death of a patient, if a person close to that patient has given consent to that effect. This regulation was introduced in 2016. However, it was highly imperfect and generated many dogmatic and practical problems. For that reason, the legislator decided to change it. The amended regulations entered into force on 9 February 2019. Their aim was to remedy existing ambiguities and subject the procedure related to violation of confidentiality under such circumstances to greater control. This article shows the evolution of this regulation and discusses its current structure. Accordingly, the article presents the notion of a close person, the possibility of making use of a judicial procedure in case of doubts as to whether the person who gives the consent is authorised to do so, as well as to resolve disputes between close persons. In addition, rules for making medical records of a patient available after that patient's death were also described.
Introduction
Even as far back as antiquity, it was emphasized that it is a physician's duty to maintain professional secrecy. This obligation was included in the so-called Hippocratic Oath, whose fragment stated: "and whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge". The obligation to maintain discretion was later repeated in deontological acts addressed to physicians. As an example, one can cite Art. 2 of the Rules for Rights and Obligations of Physicians, adopted by the Warsaw Medical Society in 1884, which stated that "a physician ought to keep secrets concerning a patient in strict confidence and divulge them only at the request of authorities or if public interest so requires". Traditionally, it was assumed that the obligation to maintain secrecy binds the physician even after the patient's death. These views were expressed, among others, by § 12 of the Code of Medical Deontology adopted at the 10th Congress of Polish Doctors and Naturalists in Lviv on 24 July 1907, according to which "a physician is also obliged to keep the secrets of the deceased who were in that physician's care" [1] . Similar regulations were included in interwar acts. For instance, § 16 of the Rules for Medical Deontology in force within the Vilnius-Novgorod Medical Chamber of 1929 provided that "a physician is also obliged to keep the secrets of the deceased who were in that physician's care or whom that physician examined after death during a post-mortem" [1] . Nowadays, Rafał Kubiak, The right of a close person to access medical data after the death of a patient this issue is covered by Art. 23 of the Code of Medical Ethics, whose final sentence states that "death of a patient does not waive the obligation to maintain medical confidentiality". Legislation was likewise drafted in a similar vein. A relevant solution was included in the original wording of the current Act of 5 December 1996 on the professions of physician and dentist, hereinafter referred to as the APPD [2] . In accordance with its Art. 40 para. 3, a physician, as a rule, was obliged to maintain confidentiality even after the patient's death (with exceptions specified in Art. 40 para. 2 of the Act, e.g. if the patient had previously consented to disclosure of confidential information). Regulations defining the rights of patients were consistent with this provision. And so, Art. 14 para. 3 of the Act of 6 November 2008 on patients' rights and the Patients' Rights Ombudsman, hereinafter referred to as the APR, persons who practice a medical profession and provide health care services were, as a rule, obliged to maintain confidentiality even after the patient's death [3] .
Such a broad approach to the obligation in question has a deep theoretical justification. Literature points to several concepts which explain the need to maintain secrecy. For example, it is argued that it is necessary for conducting a proper diagnostic and therapeutic process. In order to make a correct diagnosis and then carry out a proper treatment, a physician often has to obtain information (collected in medical history) from the patient which can deeply interfere with his/her privacy. Therefore, the patient has to be certain that this information will be kept confidential (the so-called conventionalist concept) [4] . It is also argued that the obligation to maintain confidentiality, even after the death of the person whom the data concerns, is an element characteristic for the structure of a so-called profession of public trust. This group includes the profession of a physician [5] .
From a legal point of view, however, the reference to the right to privacy is the most important. This value is held in high regard in democratic states of law, including Poland. It is therefore not surprising that it was raised to constitutional rank. According to Art. 47 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, everyone has the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life. Information concerning health and treatment is thus also protected. This is because it falls under the broadly defined private life. This thesis was confirmed by the Constitutional Tribunal, which in its judgment of 19 May 1998 declared that "information concerning health (type of disease), given in the medical certificate as the statistical number of the disease, belongs to the sphere of an individual's private life" [6] . Bearing in mind that the right to medical confidentiality is derived from constitutionally protected civic rights, it is worth to look at Art. 31 para. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which enacts the so-called principle of proportionality. According to that principle, any restrictions on exercising constitutional freedoms and rights, and therefore also in the sphere of privacy and medical discretion, must be regulated by a statute. Furthermore, such restrictions may be imposed only when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other persons. In addition, such restrictions may not violate the essence of freedoms and rights. This provision means that any exceptions which would allow for waiving medical discretion must be specified in a statute and strongly justified by the aforementioned circumstances. Introducing regulations which loosen the medical data protection system must be therefore carefully considered and thoroughly motivated.
Disclosure of confidential medical information after the patient's death
As mentioned at the beginning, the obligation to maintain medical confidentiality continues even after the death of the patient. However, this obligation is not absolute. Regulations allow confidential information to be disclosed under certain circumstances, much like when the patient was alive. Without detailing these dispensations, it is worth to mention disclosure of confidential data when the patient (during his/her lifetime) or the patient's legal representative has given consent to do so, when maintaining confidentiality would endanger the life or health of third parties or when other statutes so provide (e.g. after medical confidentiality was waived by a court in the course of criminal proceedings, pursuant to Art. 180 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, the original wording of Art. 40 of the APPD and Art. 14 of the APR did not empower third parties, e.g. family members, to waive discretion after the death of the patient. This legal status has changed as a result of amendment to the aforementioned provisions made on 5 August 2016 [7] . The explanatory memorandum to the draft amendment act stated that under the current legal status medical confidentiality was defined too broadly, which often prevented the closest relatives of a deceased patient from pursuing civil claims or criminal prosecution of a physician. Furthermore, the drafters pointed out that "as a result, medical confidentiality can, in individual cases, be used to hide instances of medical malpractice, against the interest of the patient. Moreover, disclosure of objective causes of a patient's death may also be in the public interest.
[…]". It was therefore proposed that after the patient's death, confidential information would be managed by the so-called close persons, as they share a "bond of exceptional trust" with the patient. There is thus no danger that they would violate the patient's personal rights [8] .
As an aside, it is worth noting that these theses were not confirmed by any statistical, criminological or sociological studies. The number of cases where a physician avoided liability by pleading medical confidentiality was not given. The claim that close persons always had a good relationship with the patient and never acted to his/her detriment would also have to be considered too optimistic. Although the legislative process progressed at a rapid pace, opinions of both the medical and legal community were presented for this draft. The former was represented by the Presidium of the Supreme Medical Council, which in its opinion of 20 May 2016 (Nr 27/16/P-VII) was critical of the proposed changes [9] . It emphasized that only the patient, while he/she is alive, can make decisions with respect to medical data which concerns him/her. This thesis is supported by the structure of medical and legal provisions which create the aforementioned right during the patient's lifetime. These regulations do not allow close persons to waive the obligation to maintain discretion under such circumstances, and moreover, these persons generally do not have the right to access such information. There is therefore no justification for them to obtain such a right after the patient's death. The opinion concluded that "it should be emphasized that the patient often wants to keep certain information about his/her health, especially information of intimate nature, secret precisely from those closest to him/her".
It was also noted that the draft did not provide for any solutions which would guarantee that confidentiality would be maintained if the patient, while he/she was still alive, expressly stated that the data is to remain confidential after his/her death. In terms of legal principles, the draft was reviewed by the Supreme Court. In its letter dated 10 June 2016 [10] , this body made a number of negative comments regarding the proposed solutions. In particular, constitutional doubts were raised in view of the already mentioned principle of proportionality, expressed in Art. 31 para. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Introducing the possibility for a physician to be released from the obligation to maintain confidentiality by close persons (e.g. family members) after the death of the patient was deemed insufficiently justified. In the Supreme Court's opinion, a number of provisions which enabled such persons to access confidential data were already present in existing regulations, e.g. a patient, while still alive, could authorise a physician to disclose such information after the patient's death and to make his/her medical records available to such a person. In addition, waiving was possible via judicial authorisation in pending criminal proceedings, while civil courts had access to medical records. In the light of the cited principle of proportionality, introduction of new provisions was thus neither necessary nor justified. Despite these comments and reservations, these provisions were adopted and entered into force. And so, according to the new wording of Art. 40 para. 3 of the APPD, maintenance of medical confidentiality after the patient's death was retained as a rule, but now discretion can be waived by a close person as defined in Art. 3 para. 1 item 2 of the APR. Next, the added para. 3a decreed that such waiving does not apply if another close person objects to disclosure of confidential information. A similar solution, but more widely applicable, as it pertains to all persons who provide health care services, was introduced in Art. 14 of the APR.
From the very beginning, these provisions raised doubts and caused practical problems. This is because it was unclear what a physician should do if the patient, before dying, expressly stated that certain data should remain confidential after his/her death. In such a case, should the patient's will take priority, or should the position of a closed person, who allows for disclosure of confidential information, be decisive? It was also unclear whether the physician was obliged to look for close persons or what form should the consent to violate confidentiality, or any objection thereto, take. Theoretically, it could therefore be done in any form: orally, in writing, by means of electronic communication, e.g. via SMS [11] . These shortcomings were noticed by the Minister of Health, who proposed an amendment to this regulation. And so, on 24 October 2017, a draft amendment was submitted to the Sejm. It assumed that the waiving would be done by a court, not by a close person. This submission, however, was not adopted in this wording, but in the course of parliamentary work took a much more elaborate shape. The amendment act was ultimately adopted by the Sejm on 6 December 2018, and entered into force on 9 February 2019 [12] .
The current wording of these provisions retains the rule that physicians (and other medical practitioners) are obliged to maintain medical confidentiality even after the death of the patient. Confidential information may be disclosed under any of the dispensations listed in Art. 40 para. 2 items 1-5 of the APPD, i.e. when: Rafał Kubiak, The right of a close person to access medical data after the death of a patient -so provided by other statutes; -medical examination was conducted at the request of authorised, under separate statutes, bodies and institutions; under such circumstances, the physician is obliged to inform only these bodies and institutions about the patient's health; -maintaining confidentiality may endanger the life or health of other persons; -the patient (during his/her lifetime) or the patient's legal representative has given consent to disclose confidential information, after the patient was informed about any adverse effects of disclosure; -there is a need to provide necessary information concerning the patient to a court-appointed physician (although this exception does not seem to be of practical significance after the death of the patient). Consent to disclose confidential information may also be given by a close person, wherein that person can authorise disclosure of all confidential data or narrow the scope of disclosure. The competence of a close person was therefore retained. Given that fact, it is worth to present this term in more detail. It has a statutory definition, contained in Art. 3 para. 1 item 2 of the APR. According to this provision, this group includes: -the spouse -relatives by blood up to the second degree of consanguinity -in the original wording, the Act narrowed this category to only lineal blood relatives. Such provision resulted in the exclusion of, among others, siblings, which caused some controversy. The subject amendment removed this restriction. It can therefore be assumed that currently the regulation applies to both lineal and collateral blood relatives. These terms are defined in Art. 617 of the Family and Guardianship Code (hereinafter referred to as the "FGC" should be considered as essential and necessary elements of cohabitation: mental and physical union, economic community and durability of the relationship. This is because these elements indicate a potential existence of such a relationship between two people of the opposite sex which differs from marriage only in that it lacks legal validation of actual marriage" [13] . It can therefore be assumed that such a relationship is a surrogate for marriage, although it has not been formalized. This approach led to yet another controversy. Namely, since Art. 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that marriage is a union of a man and a woman, and the construct in question is to be a substitute for marriage, is it then limited only to heterosexual relationships, or does it also encompass homosexual relationships? This dilemma seems to have been resolved by the Supreme Court, which in a resolution passed by 7 judges on 25 February 2016 [14] decided that "persons who are in such a relationship need not be of different genders to be considered cohabitating". There is no doubt, however, that the presented category may cause a number of practical difficulties, which will only escalate after the patient's death. After all, a physician has no legal instruments or actual means to check whether a given person who claims to have been cohabitating (especially if many years have passed since death) was in fact in such a relationship. It would seem that this problem has been noticed by the legislator, who introduced certain security mechanisms in the discussed amendment. Namely, according to Art. 40 para. 3b of the APPD, a physician may, in case of reasonable doubts, lodge with a court a request to determine whether a person requesting or opposing disclosure of confidential information is a close person. This regulation is correlated with Art. 40 para. 3d item 2 of the APPD, which states that under such circumstances the court examines the actual relationship of a close person with the deceased patient. The legislator did not specify the circumstances on the basis of which the court is to determine this relationship. It should therefore be assumed that the court will be able to use all types of evidence, e.g. witness statements. However, should the court be unable to determine such a relationship or have reasonable doubts in this regard, it ought to opt for maintaining confidentiality. This is because confidentiality is waived by exception, and in accordance with the "exceptiones non sunt extentendae" principle, exceptions are not to be interpreted broadly; -a person specified by the patient -before dying, a patient may authorise any person to obtain information after his/her death. This does not have to be a close relative or friend. Furthermore, the patient may specify a wider group of people and vary the scope of authorisation. A physician may not contest this choice, but is bound by it. To facilitate determination of the group of persons who are authorised, the legislator has ordained that the patient's statement concerning such authorisation should be placed into or attached to internal individual medical records; this statement should include the name of the authorised person and data for contacting that person ( § 8 para. 1 item 1 of the Ordinance of the Minister of Health of 9 November 2015 on the types of, scope of and templates for medical records as well as means of their processing) [15] . The right of a close person is excluded if the patient objected to disclosure of confidential information while still alive. This provision (Art. 40 para. 3a of the APPD) is the answer to dilemmas which arose under previous regulation and is a move in the right direction -protection of the patient's privacy. For evidence purposes, such objection should be attached to medical records. However, there are instances when confidential data may be crucial to resolving a court case or protecting important interest of third parties. For this reason, the legislator allows for the possibility of overruling the will of the patient and disclosing confidential information despite that patient's objection. However, permission in that respect must be given by the court. The relevant proceedings are initiated at the request of a close person. The court may grant such permission only if confidential information is necessary for pursuing damages or compensation on account of the patient's death, or for protecting the life or health of a close person. The court may also narrow the scope of waiving of confidentiality, based on the aforementioned premises. In order to determine these circumstances, the court is obliged to examine the interests of participants in the proceedings (whether confidential data is in fact crucial to their pursuit of claims), the will of the deceased and the circumstances surrounding the objection (Art. 40 para. 3d of the APPD).
The current regulation also retains the possibility for another close person to object. However, the regulations now clarify the procedure in this case. First, such objection should be attached to the patient's medical records. It can therefore be assumed that it must be expressed in writing. Second, the procedures to be followed in the event of a dispute between close persons (one agrees to disclose the confidential information, while the other objects to it) have been regulated. Pursuant to Art. 40 para. 3b of the APPD, under such circumstances it is possible for one of these close persons or a physician to lodge with a court a request to resolve the issue. The competent court in this case is the so-called probate court referred to in Art. 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to this provision, probate court means the court with jurisdiction over the testator's last place of habitual residence, and if his/her place of habitual residence in Poland cannot be determined, the court with jurisdiction over the place where the estate of the deceased or part thereof is located (court of inheritance). In the absence of the above grounds, the court of inheritance means the District Court for the Capital City of Warsaw. Referring this provision to the case at hand, competent court will be the court with jurisdiction over the last place of residence of the deceased patient, and if it cannot be determined, the Warsaw court. Proceedings are non-litigious. The court bases its decision on the aforementioned circumstances, in particular it examines the interest of participants in the proceedings and the circumstances surrounding the objection. It can authorize either full or limited violation of confidentiality.
Access to medical records after the patient's death
Data covered by medical discretion can also be found in medical records. They are therefore protected in this respect on the same terms as medical confidentiality. Access to records is regulated and possible only in cases specified in Art. 26 of the APR.
Rafał Kubiak, The right of a close person to access medical data after the death of a patient
After the death of the patient, records may be made available to entities and persons indicated in Art. 26 para. 3 of the APR, e.g. courts, including disciplinary courts, prosecutor's offices, court-appointed physicians and professional liability ombudsmen, in connection with conducted proceedings. Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 26 para. 1 of the APR, the patient or the patient's statutory representative may authorise a third party to access the records. Much like in case of authorisation to disclose data subject to medical confidentiality, the patient has complete discretion in deciding who shall be authorised in this manner. The patient can also specify any group of such persons and vary the scope of their authorisation (e.g. state that a particular person can access only certain records). Pursuant to § 8 para. 1 item 2 of the already cited Ordinance of the Minister of Health on the types of, scope of and templates for medical records as well as means of their processing, the relevant statement should be either placed into or attached to medical records. It should contain the name of the authorized person.
However, the original wording of these provisions did not make it clear whether a person authorised while the patient was still alive retained his/her rights also after the patient's death. This is because if one assumed that such an authorisation is a power of attorney as defined by the civil law, then according to Art. 101 § 2 of the Civil Code, an authorisation given during one's lifetime would expire at the time of death and the authorised person would lose the ability to examine medical records. However, court and administrative rulings adopted a different view, namely that "the «authorisation» referred to in Art. 26 of the Act on patients' rights and the Patients' Rights Ombudsman constitutes a separate construct created for the purposes of that Act. It is not a type of a power of attorney as defined in the Civil Code. What distinguishes the «authorisation» is the fact that it does not expire with the patient's death, but continues to have legal effects even after his/her death, while a traditional power of attorney expires with the death of the principal" [16] . This thesis was articulated even more strongly in the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 September 2013 [17] , which explained that "a person whom a patient, during his/her lifetime, authorised to view medical records, retains this right even after the death of that patient". This position was praised in literature [18] . Taking this interpretation into account, the legislator decided to clarify the provision in question in accordance with it. Through the Act of 23 March 2017 on amendment of the Act on patients' rights and the Patients' Rights Ombudsman and certain other Acts [19] , the legislator gave new wording to Art. 26 para. 2 of the APR. Pursuant to that new wording, medical records may be made available after the patient's death to a person authorised by the patient while the patient was still alive or to a person who at the time of the patient's death was his/her statutory representative. It was therefore clearly established that a person whom the patient authorised in such a manner retains this authorisation even after that patient's death.
The issue of making records available after the patient's death was also the subject of an amendment which entered into force on 9 February 2019. Provisions were introduced to synchronise it with regulations concerning the waiving of medical confidentiality after the death of the patient. This was done because the previous legal status allowed for paradoxical situations: although a close person could consent to disclosure of discrete data, he/she did not have access to medical records containing that data. He/she could circumvent this prohibition by e.g. demanding that a doctor who refused to make records available read their content, and obtain confidential information of interest to him/her that way. There was a clear lack of compatibility between these regulations. Therefore, the amendment in question unified the procedures. In Art. 26 para. 2 of the APR, a fragment was added, stating that medical records are made available after the patient's death also to a close person, wherein this right is excluded if: 1. The patient objected to it during his/her lifetime.
Another close person objected.
In paragraphs 2a-2c added to Art. 26, structures appearing with respect to disclosure of confidential medical information were repeated. And so, these paragraphs introduced the possibility of judicial resolution of disputes between close persons, enabled physicians (and other medical practitioners) to turn to courts in the event of doubts as to whether the person who requests that medical records be made available or objects to it is a close person, and introduced the possibility of judicial overruling of the will of the patient who forbade access to his/her medical records before dying. The grounds for making rulings and applicable judicial procedures are identical to those already discussed in relation to waiving of medical discretion.
Conclusions
Nowadays, the right to privacy is held in high regard, as an important value in democratic states of law. Therefore, the right to decide on disclosure of one's data, including data concerning health and treatment, deserves particular protection as a part of that right. Medical confidentiality should therefore be strictly maintained, including after the death of the person concerned. Exceptions to the prohibition of disclosure of confidential information should be formulated very carefully, with important social or third party needs in mind. In that regard, one can have doubts whether the currently adopted solutions which allow disclosure of confidential data after the patient's death are in fact necessary, and, consequently, whether these regulations meet the standards stemming from Art. 31 para. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. However, the legislator should be praised in that the discussed amendment largely removed the controversies and practical problems which had been arising previously. Handing these matters over for review by courts is certainly a better solution than leaving the decision to a physician, who, after all, has no way of verifying whether a person who is requesting access to confidential data is actually authorised to do so. A court will likely have broader factual and legal powers in that respect. However, these regulations are still new. Only time will tell whether the current solutions will be able to dispel doubts and sufficiently protect the privacy of the patient.
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Streszczenie
Przestrzeganie tajemnicy medycznej stanowi podstawowy obowiązek lekarza. Wyprowadza się ją z prawa do prywatności, które jako wartość konstytucyjnie chroniona, może być ograniczone jedynie wyjątkowo. Przepisy medyczno-prawne powinny więc precyzyjnie definiować wyjątki o dyskrecji. Jednym z nich jest możliwość wyjawienia sekretu po śmierci pacjenta po udzieleniu zgody przez jego osobę bliską. Regulacja ta została wprowadzona w 2016 roku. Była jednak wysoce niedoskonała i generowała wiele problemów dogmatycznych i praktycznych. Ustawodawca zdecydował się więc dokonać jej zmiany. Znowelizowane przepisy weszły w życie z dniem 9 lutego 2019 roku. Ich celem było usunięcie dotychczasowych niejasności i poddanie silniejszej kontroli procedury związanej z naruszeniem tajemnicy w takiej sytuacji. W artykule przedstawiono ewolucję tego unormowania oraz omówiono jego aktualną konstrukcję. Przybliżono zatem pojęcie osoby bliskiej, możliwość skorzystania z procedury sądowej w wypadku wątpliwości, czy osoba udzielająca zezwolenia jest do tego uprawniona, a także rozwiązywania sporów między osobami bliskimi. Ponadto zaprezentowano zasady udostępniania dokumentacji medycznej pacjenta po jego śmierci. 
Wstęp
Już od czasów starożytnych akcentowano, że ważną powinnością lekarza jest zachowanie tajemnicy zawodowej. Obowiązek ten był ujęty w tak zwanej przysiędze Hipokratesa, której fragment brzmiał: "Cokolwiek przy leczeniu, albo też poza leczeniem w życiu ludzi ujrzę lub usłyszę, czego ujawnić nie można przechowam w milczeniu". Nakaz zachowania dyskrecji był następnie powtarzany w aktach deontologicznych adresowanych do lekarzy. Jako przykład można podać art. 2 Zasad Obowiązków i Praw Lekarzy, przyjętych przez Warszawskie Towarzystwo Lekarskie w 1884 roku, który stanowił, że "lekarz powinien zachować ściśle tajemnice dotyczące chorego i wyjawić je może tylko na żądanie władzy lub gdzie interes publiczny wymagać tego będzie". Tradycyjnie uznawano też, że powinność zachowania sekretu wiąże lekarza także po śmierci pacjenta. Wyrazem tych zapatrywań był między innymi § 12 Kodeksu deontologii lekarskiej przyjętego na X Zjeździe Lekarzy i Przyrodników Polskich we Lwowie w dniu 24 lipca 1907 roku, w myśl którego "lekarz obowiązany jest także zachować tajemnicę osób zmarłych, które miał w opiece lekarskiej" [1] . Podobne unormowania zawarte były w aktach międzywojennych. Przykładowo w § 16 Zasad deontologii lekarskiej obowiązującej na terenie Wileńsko-Nowogrodzkiej Izby Lekarskiej z 1929 roku normowano, że "lekarz obowiązany jest także zachować tajemnicę osób zmarłych, które miał w opiece lekarskiej lub też zbadał po śmierci podczas obdukcji" [1] . Współcześnie problematyce tej poświęcony jest art. 23 Kodeksu Etyki Lekarskiej, który w ostatnim zdaniu stanowi, że "śmierć chorego nie zwalnia od dochodzenia tajemnicy lekarskiej".
W podobnym duchu utrzymane były również regulacje prawne. Rozwiązanie takie znalazło się też w pierwotnym brzmieniu obecnie obowiązującej ustawy z dnia 5 grudnia 1996 roku o zawodach lekarza i lekarza dentysty, zwanej dalej UZL [2] . Zgodnie z jej art. 40 ust. 3 lekarz co do zasady był związany tajemnicą również po śmierci pacjenta (poza wyjątkami, określonymi w art. 40 ust. 2 ustawy, np. gdy pacjent uprzednio wyraził zgodę na wyjawienie sekretu). Z postanowieniem tym spójne były regulacje określające prawa pacjenta. W myśl bowiem art. 14 ust. 3 ustawy z dnia 6 listopada 2008 roku o prawach pacjenta i Rzeczniku Praw Pacjenta, zwanej dalej UPP, osoby wykonujące zawód medyczny, udzielające świadczeń zdrowotnych, zasadniczo były związane tajemnicą również po śmierci pacjenta [3] .
Tak szerokie ujęcie omawianego obowiązku ma głębokie uzasadnienie teoretyczne. W literaturze wskazuje się bowiem na kilka koncepcji wyjaśniających potrzebę przestrzegania sekretu. Przykładowo podnosi się, że jest on konieczny dla prowadzenia prawidłowego procesu diagnostyczno-terapeutycznego. Lekarz, by mógł postawić właściwe rozpoznanie i następnie dobrze leczyć, musi niejednokrotnie uzyskać od chorego informacje (zbierane podczas wywiadu), które mogą głęboko ingerować w jego intymność. Pacjent musi być zatem pewien, że pozostaną one poufne (tzw. koncepcja konwencjonalistyczna) [4] . Podaje się również, że obowiązek zachowania tajemnicy, także po śmierci osoby, której dane dotyczą, jest elementem charakterystycznym dla konstrukcji tak zwanego zawodu zaufania publicznego. Profesję lekarza zalicza się zaś do tej grupy [5] .
Z prawnego punktu widzenia najistotniejsze jest jednak odwołanie się do prawa do prywatności. Wartość ta jest wysoko ceniona w demokratycznych państwach prawnych, w tym w Polsce. Nie dziwi więc, że została podniesiona do rangi konstytucyjnej. Zgodnie z art. 47 Konstytucji RP, każdy ma prawo do ochrony prawnej życia prywatnego, rodzinnego, czci i dobrego imienia oraz do decydowania o swoim życiu osobistym. Ochronie podlegają więc również informacje dotyczące stanu zdrowia i odbywanego leczenia.
Mieszczą się one bowiem w szeroko rozumianym życiu prywatnym. Tezę tę potwierdził Trybunał Konstytucyjny, który w wyroku z dnia 19 maja 1998 roku orzekł, że "informacja o stanie zdrowia (rodzaju schorzenia), podana w zaświadczeniu lekarskim w postaci numeru statystycznego choroby, należy do sfery życia prywatnego jednostki" [6] . Mając na względzie, że prawo do tajemnicy medycznej jest wyprowadzane z uprawnień obywatelskich, chronionych konstytucyjnie, warto zwrócić uwagę na art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP, który statuuje tak zwaną zasadę proporcjonalności. W jej myśl, wszelkie ograniczenia w zakresie korzystania z konstytucyjnych wolności i praw, a więc również w sferze prywatności i dyskrecji medycznej, muszą być uregulowane w ustawie. Ponadto ich limitowanie jest dopuszczalne tylko wówczas, gdy jest to konieczne w demokratycznym państwie dla jego bezpieczeństwa lub porządku publicznego bądź dla ochrony środowiska, zdrowia i moralności publicznej, albo wolności i praw innych osób. Ograniczenia te nie mogą też naruszać istoty wolności i praw. Z przepisu tego wynika, że wszelkie wyjątki pozwalające na zwolnienie z dyskrecji medycznej, muszą być ujęte w ustawie i silnie uzasadnione wspomnianymi okolicznościami. Wprowadzanie regulacji, rozszczelniających system ochrony danych medycznych, musi być zatem głęboko przemyślane i dokładnie umotywowane.
Ujawnienie tajemnicy medycznej po śmierci pacjenta
Jak wspomniano na wstępie, obowiązek zachowania tajemnicy medycznej trwa także po śmierci chorego. Jednakże powinność ta nie ma charakteru bezwzględnego. Przepisy dozwalają bowiem na wyjawienie sekretu w kilku sytuacjach, podobnie jak za życia pacjenta. Nie referując szczegółowo tych dyspens, warto wymienić choćby ujawnienie danych poufnych za zgodą pacjenta (naturalnie wyrażoną za życia) lub jego przedstawiciela ustawowego; gdy zachowanie tajemnicy zagrażałoby życiu lub zdrowiu osób trzecich oraz gdy tak stanowią inne ustawy (np. po zwolnieniu z tajemnicy lekarskiej w toku postępowania karnego przez sąd, na zasadach art. 180 § 2 Kodeksu postępowania karnego). W pierwotnym brzmieniu art. 40 UZL oraz art. 14 UPP nie wprowadzono jednak kompetencji osób trzecich, na przykład członków rodziny, do zwalniania z dyskrecji po zgonie chorego. Ten stan prawny uległ zmianie w wyniku nowelizacji wspomnianych przepisów, dokonanej z dniem 5 sierpnia 2016 roku [7] . W uzasadnieniu do projektu ustawy nowelizującej wyjaśniano, że w dotychczasowym stanie prawnym tajemnica medyczna była zbyt szeroko ujęta, co często uniemożliwiało osobom najbliższym Rafał Kubiak, Prawo dostępu osoby bliskiej do danych medycznych po śmierci pacjenta zmarłego pacjenta dochodzenie roszczeń cywilnych lub karnego ścigania lekarza. Projektodawcy wskazywali dalej, że "w efekcie tajemnica lekarska może być w jednostkowych przypadkach wykorzystywana do ukrywania błędów w leczeniu wbrew interesowi pacjenta. Ujawnienie obiektywnych przyczyn śmierci pacjenta może również leżeć w interesie społecznym. (…)". Proponowano więc, by po śmierci pacjenta dysponentem tajemnicy były jego tak zwane osoby bliskie, gdyż łączy je z chorym "węzeł szczególnego zaufania". Nie zachodzi więc niebezpieczeństwo, że naruszą one dobra osobiste pacjenta [8] .
Na marginesie warto zauważyć, że tezy te nie były potwierdzone żadnymi badanami statystycznymi, kryminologicznymi i socjologicznymi. Nie wskazano bowiem w ilu to sprawach lekarz uniknął odpowiedzialności, zasłaniając się tajemnicą medyczną. Jako zbyt optymistyczne należało też ocenić twierdzenie, iżby osoby najbliższe zawsze miały dobre relacje z chorym i nigdy nie działałyby na jego szkodę. Mimo że proces legislacyjny był bardzo szybki, do projektu tego przedstawiono opinie zarówno środowiska lekarskiego, jak i prawniczego. To pierwsze było reprezentowane przez Prezydium Naczelnej Rady Lekarskiej, które w stanowisku z dnia 20 maja 2016 roku (Nr 27/16/P-VII) krytycznie odniosło się do projektowanych zmian [9] . Podkreślano w nim, że tylko pacjent za życia może być decydentem w zakresie dotyczących go danych medycznych. Za taką tezą przemawia konstrukcja przepisów medyczno-prawnych, które kreują wspomniane uprawnienie za życia chorego. Regulacje te nie dozwalają w takiej sytuacji osobom najbliższym zwalniania z obowiązku zachowania dyskrecji, a co więcej -generalnie osoby te same nie mają prawa dostępu do takich informacji. Nie ma zatem uzasadnienia, by po zgonie uprawnienie takie uzyskiwały. Jak bowiem skonkludowano "należy podkreślić, że pacjent niejednokrotnie właśnie przed osobami najbliższymi chce zachować w tajemnicy pewne informacje, dotyczące swego stanu zdrowia, w szczególności informacje o charakterze intymnym".
Zauważano również, że w projekcie nie zostały przewidziane żadne rozwiązania gwarantujące przestrzeganie sekretu, w wypadku gdy pacjent za życia wyraźnie zastrzegł, iż po śmierci dane mają nadal pozostać poufne. Pod względem zasad prawnych projekt ten został oceniony przez Sąd Najwyższy. W piśmie z dnia 10 czerwca 2016 roku [10] organ ten zawarł szereg negatywnych uwag do proponowanych rozwiązań. W szczególności podnoszono wątpliwości konstytucyjne w świetle wspomnianej już zasady proporcjonalności, wyrażonej w art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP. Wprowadzenie możliwości zwalniania lekarza z tajemnicy po śmierci pacjenta przez osoby bliskie (np. członków rodziny) uznano za niedostatecznie uzasadnione. W opinii Sądu Najwyższego już w dotychczasowych przepisach istniało szereg unormowań umożliwiających takim osobom dostęp do danych poufnych, między innymi pacjent za życia mógł upoważnić lekarza do udzielania takich informacji po zgonie chorego oraz do udostępniania takiej osobie jego dokumentacji medycznej. Poza tym zwolnienie mogło nastąpić w drodze zezwolenia sądowego w toczącym się postępowaniu karnym, a sąd cywilny miał dostęp do dokumentacji medycznej. W świetle powołanej zasady proporcjonalności wprowadzenie nowych unormowań nie było zatem potrzebne i uzasadnione. Mimo tych uwag i zastrzeżeń przepisy te zostały uchwalone i weszły w życie. Zgodnie więc z nowym brzmieniem art. 40 ust. 3 UZL zachowano jako zasadę przestrzeganie tajemnicy medycznej po śmierci chorego, ale wprowadzono możliwość zwolnienia z dyskrecji przez osobę bliską w rozumieniu art. 3 ust. 1 pkt 2 UPP. Z kolei w dodanym ust. 3a zadekretowano, że zwolnienia takiego nie stosuje się, jeżeli inna osoba bliska sprzeciwi się ujawnieniu tajemnicy. Analogiczne rozwiązanie, ale mające bardziej uniwersalne znacznie, odnoszące się bowiem do wszystkich osób udzielających świadczeń zdrowotnych, wprowadzono do art. 14 UPP.
Od samego początku przepisy te wzbudzały wątpliwości i rodziły problemy praktyczne. Nie było bowiem jasne, jak ma postąpić lekarz, gdy chory przed śmiercią wyraźnie zastrzegł, że pewne dane powinny pozostać sekretne po jego zgonie. Czy w takim wypadku dać prymat jego woli, czy decydujące będzie stanowisko osoby bliskiej, która zezwala na wyjawienie sekretu? Nie było też wiadomo, czy lekarz ma poszukiwać osób bliskich oraz w jakiej formie ma być udzielona zgoda na naruszenie tajemnicy, a także ewentualny sprzeciw. Teoretycznie więc mogło to nastąpić w dowolnej formie: ustnie, pisemnie, środkami komunikacji elektronicznej, na przykład za pomocą SMS [11] . Niedociągnięcia te zostały dostrzeżone przez Ministra Zdrowia, który zaproponował zmianę tej regulacji. W dniu 24 października 2017 roku skierowano więc do Sejmu projekt nowelizacji. Zakładał on, że zwolnienia będzie dokonywał sąd, a nie osoba bliska. Przedłożenie to nie zostało jednak uchwalone w tym brzmieniu, lecz w toku prac parlamentarnych przybrało znacznie bardziej rozbudowany kształt. Ostatecznie ustawa nowelizująca została przyjęta przez Sejm w dniu 6 grudnia 2018 roku, a weszła w życie z dniem 9 lutego 2019 roku [12] .
W obecnym brzmieniu w przepisach tych zachowano zasadę, że tajemnica medyczna wiąże lekarza (i inne osoby wykonujące zawód medyczny) także po śmierci chorego. Wyjawienie sekretu można nastąpić, gdy wystąpi któraś z dyspens wymienionych w art.
